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The Politics of Pregnancy Accommodation
Stephanie Bornstein*
How can antidiscrimination law treat men and women “equally” when it comes to
the issue of pregnancy? The development of U.S. law on pregnancy accommodation in the
workplace tells a story of both legal disagreements about the meaning of “equality” and
political disagreements about how best to achieve “equality” at work for women. Federal
law has prohibited sex discrimination in the workplace for over five decades. Yet, due to
long held gender stereotypes separating work and motherhood, the idea that prohibiting sex
discrimination requires a duty to accommodate pregnant workers is a relatively recent
phenomenon—and still only partially required by federal law.
This Article documents how decades of internal political conflict about what was best
for working women resulted in tortured Supreme Court precedent on, and divergent legis-
lative approaches to, accommodating pregnancy at work.  While a diverse feminist move-
ment took a variety of strategies to support pregnant workers, this Article focuses on one
core debate in antidiscrimination law: the struggle between a formal or “sameness” and a
substantive or “difference” approach to gender equality around pregnancy.  It then docu-
ments how a third, “reconstructive” approach helped modern advocates move beyond com-
paring women to men as workers and toward critiquing gendered workplace structures.
Striking a hopeful tone, the Article proposes that gender advocates’ legal and political gains
have now set the stage for U.S. law to close the remaining gaps in pregnancy accommoda-
tion—to fully reflect the fact that pregnant women work and that a significant portion of
workers become pregnant.
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INTRODUCTION
Prohibiting sex discrimination in the workplace seems like a simple
proposition: treat men and women equally. Do not assume that whether an
employee is a man, a woman, or gender non-binary relates to their ability to
perform the job. Then keep any gender biases in check and behave similarly
toward all employees.1
But how do you treat men and women “equally” when one actual, bio-
logical difference between men and women—pregnancy—impacts their
work? While all employees have the potential to become parents, only female
employees2 may become pregnant for nine months, during which most will
continue to work as long as possible.3 This creates a Catch-22 for those
seeking gender equality at work. Acknowledge this biological difference, and
it may be used against women in employment decisions—for example, when
an employer passes an employee over for promotion based on the assumption
that she may become pregnant and need leave.4 Ignore this difference, and
women are left unprotected—for example, when an employee is forced out
of work because her pregnancy requires her to sit or take more frequent
bathroom breaks than an employer normally allows.5
And then there is reality: nearly half of the U.S. workforce is now fe-
male,6 and 86% of American women have children by age forty-four.7 Two-
thirds of mothers work during their pregnancies, more than four-fifths of
1 There are no differences in people’s inherent abilities that relate to their gender; gender,
alone, makes no difference in job performance. Some women can succeed at even the most
“masculine” jobs and some men at even the most “feminine.” See Stephanie Bornstein, Equal
Work, 77 MD. L. REV. 581, 583 (citing Emily Liner, A Dollar Short: What’s Holding Women
Back from Equal Pay, THIRD WAY (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.thirdway.org/report/a-dollar-
short-whats-holding-women-back-from-equal-pay [http://perma.cc/NGJ8-ZCQ9]).
2 Predominantly female employees, that is: intersex individuals or transgender men who
have female reproductive organs may also choose to become pregnant. See, e.g., Juno Obedin-
Maliver & Harvey J. Makadon, Transgender Men and Pregnancy, 9(1) OBSTETRIC MED. 4,
4–8 (2016) (assuming that pregnancy accommodations would be related to and “because of”
pregnancy regardless of the gender identity of the birth parent).
3 See George Gao & Gretchen Livingston, Working While Pregnant is Much More Common
Than It Used to be, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2015/03/31/working-while-pregnant-is-much-more-common-than-it-used-to-be/ [http://
perma.cc/42J3-7QA7] (citing Census Bureau data that, for those giving birth between 2006
and 2008, 66% of mothers worked during their pregnancy, and 82% of those 66% worked until
within one month of their due date).
4 See, e.g., Natalie Kitroeff & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Pregnancy Discrimination Is Ram-
pant Inside America’s Biggest Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2018/06/15/business/pregnancy-discrimination.html (collecting and describ-
ing workers’ stories); Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of
the Ladder, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 16–24 (collecting and describing cases).
5 See, e.g., Kitroeff & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4 (collecting and describing
workers’ stories); Bornstein, supra note 4, at 16–24 (collecting and describing cases).
6 46.9% in 2018. Women in the Workforce - United States: Quick Take, CATALYST (June 5,
2019), https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-in-the-workforce-united-states [https://
perma.cc/L4CF-AGUC] (citing BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM
THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, tbl.3 (2019)).
7 Gretchen Livingston, They’re Waiting Longer, but U.S. Women Today More Likely to
Have Children Than a Decade ago, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://
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whom work until within one month of their due date.8 Among households
with children under age eighteen, half have a “breadwinner” mother who
contributes 40 to 100% of household income.9 As compared to the propor-
tion of white mothers who are breadwinners (20.6%), nearly three times as
many black mothers (60.9%), over twice as many Native American mothers
(44.2%), and one-and-a-half times as many Latina mothers (31.2%) are
breadwinner mothers—making the financial pressure to work through preg-
nancy disproportionately higher for women of color.10 There is simply no
denying that pregnancy is a real biological difference between men and wo-
men, and that, at some point during or at the end of a pregnancy, it will
affect most women who work.
The story of how U.S. law has responded to the issue of pregnancy
accommodation in the workplace provides an illuminating example of both
legal disagreements about the meaning of “equality” under the law and polit-
ical disagreements about how best to achieve “equality” at work for women.
Although the law has prohibited sex discrimination in the workplace for over
fifty years,11 the idea that this prohibition includes a duty to accommodate
pregnant workers is a relatively recent phenomenon12—and still not (en-
tirely) required by federal law.13 From the 1960s to the 1990s, as advocates
across the nation worked to advance gender equality, the issue of pregnancy
created a point of fracture. While a diverse feminist movement took a variety
of strategies to support pregnant workers,14 one core debate emerged in an-
tidiscrimination law. Some advocates favored a “sameness” approach seeking
“formal equality,” in which the law treats men and women exactly the same,
so that women cannot be disadvantaged by claims that they need “special
treatment” at work.15 Others pursued a “difference” approach seeking “sub-
stantive equality,” in which the law accounts for the biological difference of
pregnancy, by providing additional protections (such as accommodation and
leave) to level the playing field for women at work.16 It was not until the
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/01/18/theyre-waiting-longer-but-u-s-women-today-more-
likely-to-have-children-than-a-decade-ago/ [https://perma.cc/P6TW-DQWA].
8 See Gao & Livingston, supra note 3.
9 Julie Anderson, Quick Figures: Breadwinner Mothers by Race/Ethnicity and State, INST.
FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. 1 (Sep. 2016), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/
files/iwpr-export/publications/Q054.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S25-29WU].
10 Id. at 1–2.
11 See supra Section I.C.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. (2012).
12 See infra Section III.B; See, e.g., A Better Balance, Pregnancy Accommodation Laws in
States & Cities (March 9, 2020), https://www.abetterbalance.org/resources/fact-sheet-state-
and-local-pregnant-worker-fairness-laws [https://perma.cc/4LAL-C5GA] (noting that, in
state law, 23 of the 28 state laws requiring pregnancy accommodations have been passed since
2013).
13 See infra Part III.
14 For a full discussion of the diverse feminist strategies around pregnany at work—which
is beyond this Article’s focus on one key distinction in antidiscrimination law—see DEBORAH
DINNER, THE SEX EQUALITY DILEMMA: WORK, FAMILY, AND LEGAL CHANGE IN NE-
OLIBERAL AMERICA (forthcoming 2021).
15 See infra Section II.A.
16 See infra Section II.B.
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2000s when advocates began to move away from the “sameness/difference
debate,” comparing women and men as workers, and toward a “reconstruc-
tive” approach, critiquing the design of the workplace.17
This Article documents how decades of internal political conflict about
what was best for working women resulted in tortured Supreme Court pre-
cedent on, and divergent legislative approaches to, accommodating preg-
nancy at work. It then argues that current advocacy efforts around a unified
approach reflect success in moving beyond sameness and difference, to a fo-
cus on unequal workplace structures. Part I of this Article provides a brief
history of early notions of domesticity and sex role stereotypes that created a
hostility to women’s market participation and set the tone for how pregnancy
has been treated at work ever since. Because of the rigid persistence of these
stereotypes, the workplace has failed to adapt: working women were, and
remain today, largely left to their own individual devices to navigate working
while pregnant. Part II tells the story of how gender equality advocates
struggled to develop a political and legal strategy that could best serve work-
ing women who became pregnant without creating laws that could backfire
to their detriment. It traces competing sameness and difference visions of
equality that led to disparate legal approaches, followed by the emergence of
a third, reconstructive approach that created a path to unify the two.
Part III brings the political and legal stories up to date, focusing on case
law and legislative advocacy in the most recent five years. It suggests that the
Supreme Court’s confusing decision in the 2015 case Young v. UPS18 reflects
the Court’s own attempt to bridge the sameness/difference divide. It also
argues that, by mirroring advocates’ strategic turmoil, the Court’s decision
may have had a unifying effect. In a hopeful vein, the Article concludes that
the tipping point may have, at long last, been reached. Since the Young deci-
sion, women’s political power has surged to a new high point, both in repre-
sentation in courts and legislatures and as a powerful voting bloc. This
political breathing room, combined with a modern theory of how to ap-
proach pregnancy discrimination at work, has set the stage for federal law to
move beyond trying to fit women into workplaces designed around men, to
fully accept and reflect that pregnant women work and that workers get
pregnant.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PREGNANCY AND WORK LAW: EVERY
WOMAN FOR HERSELF
Despite a dramatic increase in women’s labor force participation over
time, workplace law’s treatment of pregnancy was largely shaped by the
17 See, e.g., infra Section II.C; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY
AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 4, 40-63, 178–80, 213–26 (2000)
[hereinafter UNBENDING GENDER]; Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the
Way We Talk About Gender and Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
79, 82, 89–90, 98–102 (2009) [hereinafter Reconstructive Feminism].
18 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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Nineteenth Century cult of domesticity that cast women as mothers first,
outsiders to the market sphere.19 This Part traces the development of the law
of pregnancy discrimination at work over the past century, showing that,
despite great improvements in gender equality at work, “separate spheres”20
ideology continues to undermine legal protections for pregnant workers
today.
A. Protectionism & Exclusion (1800s-1964)
Modern attitudes toward pregnancy in the workplace have their earliest
roots in ideas about sex roles that gained popularity in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury. Though women have always worked, the shift from an agricultural,
home-based economy to an industrialized economy that separated work and
home spheres sparked powerful beliefs about sex roles that have persisted
over time.21 In the late 1800s, Victorian notions of “domesticity” and “sepa-
rate spheres” took hold in the middle and upper classes of England and the
United States, dictating that men, but not women should work outside the
home.22 When work and home were separated into workplace and home
place, domesticity instructed that women were ill-suited to the market
sphere because of their primary roles as mothers.23 Even poor women and
women of color who, in contrast to affluent white women, were expected or
required to work primarily held domestic positions, helping with housework
or child care in other people’s homes.24
Notions of domesticity made their way into the law in the first lawsuits
related to regulation of the workplace in the industrial age. At the turn of the
Twentieth Century, state legislatures began to address the working condi-
tions of industrialized workplaces, seeking to provide basic protections
against dangers for exploited workers. Then, in 1905, in the landmark case
Lochner v. New York,25 the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in to strike down
such regulation as unconstitutional.26 According to the Court, a state statute
that limited the work hours of bakery employees to 10 hours per day, sixty
hours per week “necessarily interfere[d] with the right of contract between
the employer and employees”—a “right to make a contract in relation to his
business [that] is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.”27 While a state legislature could act to enforce its po-
19 See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 1–9, 14–39.
20 See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 1–9, 14–39. See also Cary Franklin, Sepa-
rate Spheres, 123 YALE L.J. 2878, 2889–94 (2014).
21 See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 1–9, 14–39. See also Cary Franklin, The
Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83,
92–97 (2010); Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family Con-
flicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 1297, 1299–1302 (2012).
22 See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 1-4, 20-27, 31-33.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 162-163.
25 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
26 Id. at 74.
27 Id. at 53.
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lice powers to protect public health and safety, the Court held, “there [was]
no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty [to contract] of. . .a
baker.”28 Because bakers were male, able-bodied workers who could protect
themselves and not “wards of the state,” the law was paternalism that un-
fairly limited their ability to earn as much as they wished.29
While Lochner famously enshrined a laissez-faire approach to the regu-
lation of employment contracts of men, the Court took a different approach
for women. Three years after Lochner, in the 1908 case Muller v. Oregon,30
the Court upheld a state law that limited the maximum working hours of
women, due to the state’s concern for their “maternal functions.”31 The
Court was largely influenced by what is now known as the “Brandeis
Brief”—the first brief submitted to the Supreme Court that compiled and
relied on scientific evidence to make its legal argument.32 Authored by attor-
ney Louis Brandeis and Josephine Goldmark of the National Consumers
League, the brief aimed to limit the impact of Lochner and create protections
for all workers by, strategically, starting with women.33 Yet to do so, the brief
conflated biology and social ideas of domesticity, presenting “scientific evi-
dence” that women’s roles as mothers made their health a “matter of public
concern.”34 The brief did its job—perhaps too well. As the Court reasoned:
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence
is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood
are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of
the medical fraternity[,] continuance for a long time on her feet at
work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects
upon the body. . .[A]s healthy mothers are essential to vigorous
offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of
public interest and care. . .to preserve the strength and vigor of the
race.35
The Muller decision was followed by a series of similar holdings for
nearly two decades, in which courts justified state interference in the liberty
of contract of women only, based on their primary role in society as
mothers.36 By the mid-1920s, almost all states limited women’s, but not
28 Id. at 57.
29 Id. at 57–58.
30 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
31 Id. at 421.
32 See Louis D. Brandeis School of Law Library, The Brandeis Brief—In Its Entirety,
https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-brandeis-collection/the-bran-
deis-brief-in-its-entirety [https://perma.cc/Y96D-9NVK]; Ann Corinne Hill, Protection of
Women Workers and the Courts: A Legal Case History, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 246, 250–57 (1979).
33 See Hill, supra note 32, at 250–57.
34 See id. at 252–53.
35 Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
36 See, e.g., Bosley v McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v Wilson, 236 U.S. 373
(1915).
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men’s, working hours to between eight and twelve hours per day.37 One-
third of states prohibited women from working at night, and a handful of
states prohibited women from working in particular jobs for which they were
deemed unsuited—including taxi driver, smelter or miner, baggage handler,
or working in bowling alleys, pool rooms, or “public drinking places catering
exclusively to males.”38
In the wake of Muller and its progeny, some advocates and economists
argued that protective laws hurt women economically.39 Fifteen years after
Muller, in Adkins v. Children’s Hosp.,40 Goldmark and attorney Felix Frank-
furter authored a second brief using similar scientific evidence to argue that
dangerous working conditions hurt men, too.41 The second brief backfired:
instead of extending minimum labor protections to men, the Court in Adkins
ruled that women (who had recently gained the right to vote) no longer
needed special treatment, struck down sex-specific protective labor laws, and
reified Lochner.42 While this meant that women now enjoyed formal equality
at work, it also left U.S. workplaces largely unregulated until the New Deal’s
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 put the same limitations on the working
hours and minimum wages of all workers, men and women alike.43
Yet domesticity’s notion of separate spheres had made its mark on the
workplace and the law in two ways. First, caselaw established women’s pri-
mary role as mothers and homemakers; that they became pregnant, bore
children, and breastfed was proof that they did not belong in any non-do-
mestic workplace once they were of childbearing age. They were outsiders to
the market sphere, which was designed around men.44 Second, if differences
between men and women were acknowledged in the workplace, they could
end up hurting women economically. Acknowledging that women gave birth
had unleashed special protective legislation that limited the hours women
could work and the types of jobs they could have.45 Because the market
sphere was meant for men, to be treated fairly at work, women needed to
assert that they were no different from men. They could do the same work
for the same hours, and they should be treated exactly the same as men.46  As
a result, in the 1940s and 50s, while all employees could now enjoy the same
37 Richard Boeckel, Sex Equality and Protective Laws 533-54 (July 13, 1926), in NA-
TIONAL WOMAN’S PARTY PAPERS, PART I: 1913-1974 http://library.cqpress.com/
cqresearcher/cqresrre1926071300 [https://perma.cc/R6QV-FG2F].
38 Id. at 540.
39 See id at 549-50. (citing, e.g., ELIZABETH FAULKNER BAKER, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION: STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW
(1924)).
40 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
41 See Hill, supra note 32, at 254–57. Brandeis had become a Supreme Court Justice by
then and recused himself from the case. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 562; MELVIN UROFSKY, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS: A LIFE 504 (2012).
42 See Hill, supra note 32, at 254–57; Adkins, 261 U.S. at 552–53.
43 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203 et. seq (2012).
44 See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 1–9, 14–39.
45 See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text.
46 See Boeckel, supra note 37.
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protection against exploitative hours and wages, no other laws protected wo-
men at work or considered that workers might become pregnant.
Women’s workforce participation continued to grow as female workers
replaced the millions of U.S. men deployed during World War II,47 such
that, by 1948, nearly one-third of all women worked48 and women composed
28.6% of the civilian labor force.49 Despite their significant presence in the
workforce, however, the fact that most women became pregnant was largely
ignored. When women became pregnant, particularly white women, they
were expected or forced to stop working altogether, regardless of whether
they wanted to continue working.50 Some women left voluntarily; others
were terminated by employers upon learning of their pregnancies.51 Women
of color often experienced the opposite assumption: even if they wanted to
stop working, they were expected to continue, ignoring their pregnancy and
any temporarily disabling conditions it may have caused.52 Regardless, the
common understanding at the time was that pregnancy existed entirely
outside of the market sphere. Workplaces were designed for men, women
who wanted to work should expect to be treated like men, and once a wo-
man became pregnant, she was no longer a worker—she was a mother.53
B. Hostile Inclusion (1964-1978)
It was more than a decade before Congress enacted the first federal
legal prohibition against sex discrimination at work, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).54 For the first time, Title VII prohibited
employers from “discriminat[ing]” against employees in hiring, firing, or
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” based on
their race, sex, or other protected characteristic.55 As the crowning achieve-
ment of the Civil Rights movement, the legislative impetus behind Title VII
47 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., AMERICA’S WARS (2017), https://www.va.gov/opa/
publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf [https://perma.cc/63PH-NK7Z].
48 U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. WOMEN’S BUREAU, LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY SEX,
RACE AND HISPANIC ETHNICITY 1948-2016 ANNUAL AVERAGES, https://www.dol.gov/wb/
stats/NEWSTATS/facts/women_lf.htm#CivilianLFSex. [https://perma.cc/7B7A-6NKY].
Note that statistics for this year do not disaggregate the labor force participation rates of wo-
men of color. It is likely that an even greater proportion of black women worked at this time.
In 1972, the first year for which race-specific data is available, 48.7% of black women and
43.2% of white women worked.
49 U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. WOMEN’S BUREAU, CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BY SEX, 1948-2016
annual averages https://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/NEWSTATS/facts/women_lf.htm#Civilian
LFSex [https://perma.cc/7B7A-6NKY].
50 Courtni E. Molnar, “Has the Millennium Yet Dawned?”: A History of Attitudes Toward
Pregnant Workers in America, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 170–79 (2005).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 1–9, 14–39.
54 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (2012).
55 Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII also makes it unlawful “to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id.
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was to outlaw race discrimination and end Jim Crow laws. During the legis-
lative process, however, legislators added “sex” as a protected characteristic to
the text of the bill, with little legislative guidance.56 The statute provided no
definition for what the category “sex” did or did not include.57 Thus, while
the prohibition was understood to mean that an employer could no longer
refuse to hire an applicant, pay her less, or fire her simply because she was a
woman and not a man, little else was clear.
For the first decade after Title VII was passed, the Act was largely
interpreted to include prohibitions against pregnancy discrimination. In
1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)—the
federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII—issued guidelines clarify-
ing that classifying workers differently based on pregnancy violated Title
VII.58 In the wake of these guidelines, six different U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeal agreed, holding that discrimination based on pregnancy constituted
prohibited sex discrimination.59
But in the 1976 case General Electric Company v. Gilbert,60 the U.S.
Supreme Court disagreed. In Gilbert, female employees sued their employer
for sex discrimination in its benefits provisions.61 The employer provided all
employees with short-term disability benefits when they could not work due
to a non-work related illness or accident, but excluded coverage for preg-
nancy.62 The District Court held that excluding only pregnancy-related ill-
nesses was sex discrimination, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.63
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that GE’s disability bene-
fits program did not discriminate based on sex but rather based on preg-
nancy, and that the two were different.64 The Court explained that “[t]he
program divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons,” and that, “[w]hile the first group is exclusively female,
the second includes members of both sexes.”65 Because not all women were
affected by a policy that penalized pregnancy, the Court reasoned, there was
no sex discrimination.66 In separating pregnancy from “sex,” the Court ig-
nored that all employees harmed by the policy would be women, meaning
that the policy would have a disproportionately negative impact on employ-
56 There is some debate over the origins of the inclusion of “sex” in Title VII, and the
various political motivations behind it—a topic beyond the scope of this article. For more on
this, see generally, Jo Freeman, How Sex Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker
of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163 (1991); Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A
Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137 (1997).
57 See AT&T v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 717 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 717 & n.2 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 37 Fed. Reg. § 6837, April 5,
1972 (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (2019))).
59 Id. (citing cases in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 9th Circuits).
60 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
61 See id. at 127–29.
62 See id. at 128–29.
63 See id. at 130–32.
64 See id. at 135.
65 Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1976)).
66 See id. at 135.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\14-2\HLP210.txt unknown Seq: 10 20-OCT-20 13:29
302 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 14
ees by sex—also prohibited by Title VII.67 And by focusing narrowly on
“pregnant persons,” the Court reinforced the idea that pregnancy was some-
thing that happened to others, not to employees, entirely outside of the mar-
ket sphere of work.
Thankfully, the impact of Gilbert was short-lived. Within days of the
decision, women’s rights advocates formed the “Coalition to End Discrimi-
nation Against Pregnant Workers” and galvanized legislators to hold hear-
ings on a legislative fix within a year.68 Congress acted swiftly to correct what
it viewed as the Court’s misinterpretation of Title VII by passing the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).69 The resulting PDA statute’s
simple approach directly amended Title VII, to include a new subsection
stating:
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work.70
With this amendment, Congress abrogated the holding in Gilbert and
established that treating an employee differently because of her pregnancy
was treating her differently because of her sex.71 The PDA also specified
that, if employers provided disability benefits, pregnant employees should be
treated “the same as” other employees with regard to their temporary disabil-
ities.72 Thus the plaintiffs in Gilbert were entitled to receive disability bene-
fits under the facts of their case.
But while the PDA required equal treatment for pregnancy and other
disabilities, neither the PDA nor Title VII nor any other federal law at the
time created a baseline requirement for how employers had to respond to
temporarily disabling conditions.73 That meant that, if all employees got
nothing—no accommodations, no benefits, no leave for temporary disabili-
ties—pregnant employees were equally entitled to nothing.
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
68 Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination by Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 11–13 (2009).
69 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
71 See Newport News Shipbuilding Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684–85 (1983).
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (“women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work”).
73 See Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729–36 (2003).
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C. Every Woman for Herself (1979-2015)
There is no doubt that, since the passage of the PDA, pregnant em-
ployees have gained significant protections at work. For example, because
pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination, courts have held that female
workers cannot be denied hire or fired or passed over for promotion because
they are pregnant,74 and that harassment on the basis of pregnancy is illegal
sex discrimination.75 Women can no longer be excluded from certain jobs
based on their potential to become pregnant,76 or forced to stop working
when they get pregnant,77 allowing them to work much longer into their
pregnancies.78 And because pregnant employees must be treated “the same
as” all other employees temporarily disabled for reasons other than preg-
nancy,79 some pregnant workers have been able to receive both temporary
accommodations and short-term disability benefits if their employers choose
to provide them for other temporary disabilities.80
Yet for nearly four decades since the enactment of the PDA, federal law
has embraced a formal equality approach that has left unaddressed much of
the real impact of pregnancy on women at work. Because the law only re-
quires equal treatment between men and women, whether a pregnant worker
has access to accommodations or any job-protected leave from work depends
entirely on the specifics of the job and the employer. When a working wo-
man becomes pregnant, she cannot be fired for that reason.81 But if, during
her pregnancy, she needs even small, temporary accommodations to be able
to continue working, she must negotiate it individually with her employer,
who is required to provide nothing unless it does so voluntarily for other
temporarily disabled employees.82 Of course, the most common form of tem-
74 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. High Speed Enterprise, Inc., 833 F.Supp.2d 1153 (D. Ariz. 2011)
(hiring); Speight v. Sonic Restaurants, Inc., 983 F.Supp.2d 1324 (D.Kan. 2013) (firing); Mc-
Elroy v. Fidelity Investments Institutional Services Co., Inc., 298 F.Supp.3d 357 (D.R.I.
2008) (promotion).
75 See, e.g., Peart v. Latham & Watkins LLP, 985 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.D.C. 2013); Gree-
nan v. Board of Educ. of Worcester County, 783 F. Supp. 2d 782 (D. Md. 2011).
76 See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991).
77 See, e.g., U.S. EEOC v. Bob Evans Farms, LLC, 275 F.Supp.3d 635 (W.D. Penn.
2017).
78 See Gao & Livingston, supra note 3.
79 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k) (2012) (“women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work”) (emphasis added).
80 See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding Co., 462 U.S. at 684–85.
81 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. While pregnancy itself is not a “disability,”
conditions caused by pregnancy may qualify as “disabilities” under the American with Disabili-
ties Act (“ADA”) as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et.
seq., providing pregnant workers additional rights to accommodations. For a discussion of
pregnancy accommodations under the ADA—which is beyond this Article’s scope—see gen-
erally Joan C. Williams, et. al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA
Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 98 (2013). For cases applying this approach, see
CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW, U.C. HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW, PREGNANCY ACCOM-
MODATION: SELECTED PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION CASES, (Sept. 18, 2017), available
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porary disability for women is pregnancy,83 which means that, when an em-
ployer chooses to accommodate no one, pregnant employees always lose.
Likewise, as discussed in Part II, the Family and Medical Leave Act is
the only federal law that provides any job-protected short-term leave for
childbirth, and its coverage is surprisingly limited.84 The Act fails to cover
40% of the U.S. workforce, and it provides only unpaid leave to those it does
cover—with the result that many fail to use some or all of their available
leave because they cannot afford to do so.85 Again, while pregnant workers
cannot be fired for being pregnant, far too many employers are not required
to hold jobs open for them, meaning the workers can simply be replaced
while out of work giving birth.86
Women in lower-paid jobs, who are disproportionately women of color,
are both the most likely to need and the least likely to have access to preg-
nancy accommodations or pregnancy leave at work.87 Pregnant women in
physically demanding jobs may, at some point, need temporary relief from or
assistance with certain tasks, like regular heavy lifting.88 Yet, so long as the
employer treats all temporary disabilities consistently, under the PDA, the
employer may refuse to alter any job tasks and even fire an employee who
cannot perform the job.89 And many pregnant women may need minor ad-
justments—for example the ability to take more frequent bathroom breaks,
to be able to carry a water bottle, or to be allowed to sit on a stool rather than
standing all day.90 But women in service and retail sector jobs often lack even
the slightest amount of control over their work, and have been refused, and
even fired over, any slight variation in the rules that apply to all employees.91
Despite the passage of the PDA, then, federal pregnancy protections at
work depend significantly on the workplace. Each individual pregnant
worker is left to navigate anything beyond formal equal treatment herself.
Most importantly, equal treatment in this context is defined by being treated
“the same as” non-pregnant employees, reflecting a workforce that, after
at https://www.pregantatwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017.09.18-Pregnancy-Accommoda-
tion-Case-List-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK6R-MUDN].
83 Compare Livingston, supra note 7 (citing Census Bureau data that 86% of women be-
come pregnant by age 44) to Kristina A.Theis, et. al., Which One? What Kind? How Many?
Types, Causes, and Prevalence of Disability Among U.S. Adults, 12 DISABILITY & HEALTH J.
411, 416 tbl.3 (2019) (citing Census Bureau data 21.8% of all adults experience a non-preg-
nancy disability, the most common being arthritis (in 14% of men, 23% of women) and back/
spine problems (in 16.8% men, 20% women)).
84 See infra Section II.A.
85 See e.g., JACOB KLERMAN, KELLY DALEY & ALYSSA POZNIAK, ABT. ASSOC., FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE IN 2012: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i–ii (2012), https://www.dol.gov/
sites/dolgov/files/OASP/legacy/files/FMLA-2012-Executive-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/
952Z-8VX4].
86 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2012).
87 See Bornstein, supra note 4, at 16–24.
88 See id. at 23.
89 See id. Note that pregnant employees may be entitled to additional accommodations
under the ADA, as amended by the ADAAA of 2008. See text and citations at note 82, supra.
90 See id. at 22.
91 See id. at 21–22.
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more than a century of robust female participation, continues to be designed
around men.92
II. DEFINING THE MOVEMENT FOR PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION:
“THE SAME AS” WHAT?
While advocates worked consistently toward improving gender equality
in the workplace, they were divided on how to deal with the issue of preg-
nancy at work. The PDA ensured basic equal treatment for pregnant work-
ers, but how best to expand available job protections remained unclear.
Should advocates seek to expand rights for both men and women as parents,
to maintain the formal equality women had been able to achieve, or should
they pursue specific additional protections for women, to level the playing
field with substantive equality? This Part documents how different political
strategies around this “sameness/difference debate” in antidiscrimination
protections for pregnant workers resulted in divergent legal solutions.93
A. Sameness Feminism, Formal Equality, and the Federal Law Approach
When workers become pregnant, they have two main needs. First, they
need the ability to take time off to give birth and recover, and to bond with
their new child, without fear of losing their jobs. Having no ability to take
job-protected time off of work for childbirth means that every woman who
gives birth can be forced out of the workforce. Meanwhile, fathers of those
children continue to pursue their careers. Second, if a woman becomes tem-
porarily disabled during pregnancy—if she experiences any disabling side ef-
fects (for example, extreme nausea) or medical complications (for example,
preeclampsia)—she needs temporary accommodations at work, also without
the risk of losing her job. Over the course of a career, a pregnancy is a tem-
porary condition. Yet gaps in U.S. law that fail to require job-protected leave
or accommodation to all workers mean that women are always at a
disadvantage.
In the wake of the PDA’s passage, gender equality advocates turned to
moving beyond mere non-discrimination, toward expanding protections for
pregnant workers. Requiring equal access to temporary disability benefits
and accommodations was a start, but no federal law required any employer to
provide any such benefits. Without an affirmative requirement, employers
were free to “treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected
but nonpregnant employees.”94
At the federal level, led by the Women’s Legal Defense Fund (now the
National Partnership for Women and Families), advocates pursued legisla-
tion that took a formal equality approach to provide gender-neutral leave.
92  UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 1–9, 14–39.
93 See also Reconstructive Feminism, supra note 17, at 82, 89–90, 98–102.
94 Troupe v. May Dep’t. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Beginning in 1984, this broad coalition of advocates worked for nearly a
decade to enact what became the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA).95 Under the Act, which remains largely the same twenty-five years
later,96 eligible employees, both women and men, receive twelve weeks of
job-protected, unpaid leave per year, plus continuation of their health care
benefits, under three circumstances: for the birth or adoption of a new child;
for their own serious health condition including pregnancy; or to care for a
child, parent, or spouse with a serious health condition.97 Notably, both birth
mothers and fathers or adoptive parents who do not give birth are entitled to
the same twelve weeks of leave total.98 Most doctors consider women dis-
abled for four to six weeks immediately at and after their deliveries, and up
to ten weeks for Cesarean deliveries.99  Regardless, the law does not provide
additional leave to birth mothers for their own period of delivery-related
disability.100 And, should a birth mother be disabled by pregnancy-related
conditions during the rest of her pregnancy, the same twelve weeks of
FMLA is intended to cover any disabling periods while pregnant.101
Strategically, advocates who pursued a formal equality approach to leave
believed it offered several advantages.102 It maintained consistency with the
95 NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, A STORY OF PASSION, PATIENCE, AND
PERSISTENCE: THE NINE-YEAR FIGHT TO MAKE THE FMLA THE LAW OF THE LAND,
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/economic-justice/history-of-the-fmla.html
[https://perma.cc/G3VY-X74L].
96 Since 1993, only one significant change has been made to the FMLA: an expansion of
unpaid leave for caregivers of members of the military related to active duty. See U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Family and Medical Leave Act - National Defense Authorization Act
for FY 2010 Amendments, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fmla/military-families [https://
perma.cc/95VK-95LJ]; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet #28M(b): Mili-
tary Caregiver Leave for a Veteran under the Family and Medical Leave Act, http://www.dol.gov/
whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28mb.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LHR-3L3E]. In addition, the U.S.
Department of Labor clarified the definition of “in loco parentis” for child-parent care provi-
sions, see U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-3,
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FMLA/2010/FMLAAI2010_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7DPY-Y6DK]; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet #28C:
FMLA leave to care for a parent with a serious health condition on the basis of an in loco parentis
relationship, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28C.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M898-TVBW], and that “child” includes adult children unable to care for themselves due to
disabilities, see U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpretation No.
2013-1, http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FMLA/2013/FMLAAI2013_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KS8-SL5H].
97 Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2012).
98 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612; 29 CFR § 825.120.
99 See, e.g., State of California Employment Development Department, FAQ – Preg-
nancy, I’m pregnant. Can I can file a claim for State Disability Insurance benefits? If so, for how
long?, https://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/FAQ_DI_Pregnancy.htm#collapseOne [https://
perma.cc/8KQ3-4ZWW]
100 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612; 29 CFR § 825.120.
101 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612; 29 CFR § 825.120. If the employer provides additional leave for
other disabilities, then the employee may be entitled to additional leave for her periods of
pregnancy-related disability under the PDA, see  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), or the ADA, see Wil-
liams et. al., supra note 82, at 136-141, but not under the FMLA.
102 See Wendy Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 325-27, 352–70 (1985) (describ-
ing various advocates’ positions); Linda J. Krieger and Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl
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PDA, which required that all employees be treated “the same.”103 It steered
clear of any protectivism or paternalism that could make women seem like
they were lesser than men or less suited for work, avoiding echoes of early
Twentieth Century hours caps for women only.104 It sought no “special treat-
ment” for women, which avoided the charge that it discriminated against
men and any related backfire effects—for example, employers avoiding hir-
ing women altogether because they were perceived as more costly.105 It also
encouraged counter-stereotypic thinking by separating childbirth from
child-rearing and allowing men to share in newborn child care, thus reduc-
ing the sole burden on women.106
Yet critics of the sameness approach feared it left women at an overall
disadvantage. By treating men and women “the same,” it ignored that only
women get pregnant, which meant they started from an unequal position.
To such critics, formal equality was not enough; to truly level the playing
field for women at work required more.107
B. Difference Feminism, Substantive Equality, and the California Law
Approach
Across the country, working at the state level, advocates in California
took a different approach. Shortly after the passage of the federal PDA, leg-
islators in California passed the California Pregnancy Disability Leave Act,
which amended their state version of Title VII to add an affirmative require-
ment for pregnancy disability leave.108 The statute allowed workers to take
leave for any periods they were disabled by pregnancy-related conditions,
including but not limited to the time around their birth, for a total of up to
Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513, 531-537 (1983) (same).
103 See Williams, supra note 103, at 367–70; Krieger & Cooney, supra note 103, at 531-
537.
104 See Williams, supra note 103 at 367–70; Krieger & Cooney, supra note 103, at 531
(“The protective legislation issue provoked heated debate within the feminist legal community.
Equal treatment proponents argued that [a pregnancy-only disability] statute is indistinguish-
able from laws which until very recently ‘protected’ women out of their jobs. Supporting such a
statute, they argued, could lend implicit justification to future ‘protective’ laws which would do
more harm than good.”); see also supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
105 See Williams, supra note 103, at 367–70.
106 See id., at 353-55.
107 See, e.g., Krieger & Cooney, supra note 103, at 537 (arguing that “the equal treatment
approach to equality cannot, in and of itself, effectuate equality between the sexes” because it
fails to “solv[e] the equality problems presented by inherent differences between men and wo-
men in the areas of pregnancy and childbirth, so it “must be expanded to permit, indeed to
require, positive action accounting for inherent sex differences, and facilitating equality of ef-
fect”); Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 375-77, 435-42
(1981) (describing—as her response to “liberal,” “assimilationist,” and “bivalent” views of sex
equality—an “incorporationist approach” that “recognize[s women] have rights different from
men only insofar as pregnancy and breastfeeding, the only aspects of childbearing and chil-
drearing completely unique to women, are directly concerned.”).
108 1978 Cal. Stats., ch. 1321, § 1; 1980 Cal. Stats., ch. 992, § 4; codified at CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 12945 (West 2018).
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four months.109 The first law in the nation to require any job-protected leave
for pregnancy, the law took a “difference” approach, seeking substantive
equality. Because only women could be disadvantaged by pregnancy at work,
including losing their jobs, the state law provided leave to only women to
remove the disadvantage.110
Shortly after the law took effect, an employer who refused to reinstate a
pregnant worker under the law sought a declaratory judgment in federal
court that, because the state statute treated men and women differently, the
state had engaged in sex discrimination against men, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution’s 14th Amendment.111 In 1987,
the employer’s challenge made it to the U.S. Supreme Court in the case
California Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra.112 The case exposed the
divide among women’s rights advocates over how best to achieve equality for
pregnant workers. On the one hand, several national women’s rights organi-
zations—including the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, who was pursuing a
formal equality approach to leave under federal law—filed an amicus brief
suggesting that, to both protect women and steer clear of Equal Protection
concerns, the California benefits be extended to all workers in a gender-
neutral fashion.113 In their view, “[i]n the long run,” the California statute
requiring temporary disability leave for only pregnancy “will hurt women
because it reinstates the view that pregnancy is different from other disabili-
ties.”114 Meanwhile, California women’s rights groups—including Equal
Rights Advocates, who favored a substantive equality approach—filed an
amicus brief supporting the state.115 As they saw it, “men never lose their
jobs due to pregnancy disability, [so] the state statute does not grant prefer-
ential treatment to women, [but] simply guarantees equality for all
workers.”116
In a holding that signaled just how far it had come from its pre-PDA
decision in Gilbert, the Supreme Court sided with California, holding that
Title VII and the PDA did not pre-empt the California statute, and that
both “share[d] a common goal” of “remov[ing] barriers” to women’s equal
109 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945(a)(1).
110 Brief of Respondents, Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987),
1986 WL 728377, at *5-*6 (1986) (“California’s pregnancy disability leave statute eliminates a
burden uniquely faced by working women: loss of job due to pregnancy disability. . .This
guarantee of continued employment protects pregnant employees from being adversely affected
due to a gender-specific characteristic. Since men never lose their jobs due to pregnancy disa-
bility, the state statute does not grant preferential treatment to women. It simply guarantees
equality fo all workers.”)
111 Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
112 See id.
113 Brief for Nat’l Org. for Women, Now Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272 (1987).
114 David G. Savage, What Is Equal?: Pregnancy on the Job Tests Law, L.A. TIMES (Sep.
24, 1986); see also id.
115 Brief for Equal Rights Advocates et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Cal.
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
116 Savage, supra note 115; see also Brief of Respondents, supra note 111.
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employment opportunity.117 In the Court’s view, Title VII was a floor, not a
ceiling, to efforts to achieve gender equality at work, and the California stat-
ute was not impermissible “special treatment.”118 Importantly, the Court
noted,
The statute is narrowly drawn to cover only the period of actual
physical disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions. Accordingly, unlike the protective labor legis-
lation prevalent earlier in this century, [the statute] does not reflect
archaic or stereotypical notions about pregnancy and the abilities
of pregnant workers. A statute based on such stereotypical as-
sumptions would, of course, be inconsistent with Title VII’s goal
of equal employment opportunity.119
As the Court saw it, treating men and women differently by removing a
barrier tied to women’s actual biological differences, not to stereotypes about
men’s and women’s sex roles, was consistent with Title VII’s prohibition on
sex discrimination.
Several years later, California continued to pursue a substantive equality
approach to pregnancy discrimination when it passed legislation requiring
employers to provide temporary accommodations to workers for their preg-
nancy disabilities, regardless of whether employers do so for other temporary
disabilities.120 First enacted in 1990 and later expanded, the statute requires
an employer to “provide reasonable accommodation for an employee for a
condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition,”
which can include “temporarily transfer[ing] a pregnant employee to a less
strenuous or hazardous position for the duration of the pregnancy” if one is
available.121 Short of transfer, the statute requires employers to provide any-
thing else deemed “reasonable,” including “temporarily modifying [ ] work
duties, providing [ ] a stool or chair, or allowing more frequent breaks.”122
California’s disability leave law protected women from losing their jobs
when temporarily unable to work due to childbirth or pregnancy. But its
accommodation law recognized that many pregnant women can remain at-
tached to the workplace with more minor temporary adjustments—that val-
uable workers become pregnant and workplaces can usually adapt without
great cost or inconvenience. The law has served as a model for other states
seeking to ensure equality for pregnant workers, and, as described in Part III,
for a federal legislative model nearly two decades later.123
117 Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 288 (1987).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 290.
120 1990 Cal. Stats., ch. 15 (S.B.1027), § 2, codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945(a)(3)
(West 2018).
121 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945(a)(3).
122 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 11051 (2015).
123 See Section III.B., infra.
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C. Reconstructing Feminism: Degendering Workplace Structures
For over thirty years since the passage of Title VII, advocates, and the
laws that resulted from their advocacy efforts, diverged. Federal law enacted
formal equality, limited to the PDA’s requirement of treating pregnancy “the
same as” other temporarily disabling conditions and the FMLA’s require-
ment of gender-neutral family and medical leave.124 California and a handful
of other state laws enacted substantive equality, offering additional leave or
accommodation solely for pregnancy disabilities.125 Both approaches were
subject to criticism for failing to achieve gender “equality”: women were ei-
ther treated like men, leaving them unaccommodated, or treated differently
from men, requiring costly “special treatment.”
In 2000, legal scholar Joan C. Williams broadened the lens from con-
sidering discrimination based on pregnancy to that based on motherhood
and, in doing so, conceived of a way to bridge the sameness/difference di-
vide.126 While pregnancy discrimination and the need for pregnancy disabil-
ity leave was an acute problem for all working women, the stereotypes of
domesticity that made workplaces hostile to pregnancy did not stop after
women gave birth.127 Regardless of her desire and ability to continue work-
ing, once a woman had a child, she was forever perceived at work as a
mother, and being a good mother was incompatible with being a competent
worker.128 Williams articulated that, because the U.S. workplace was de-
signed around a male “ideal worker” who never had to miss work for child-
birth and had no domestic responsibilities, it was inherently designed around
a masculine norm that would always disadvantage women.129
Rather than focusing on whether female workers should be treated the
same as or different from male workers, Williams’ approach—which she de-
scribed as one of “reconstructive feminism”—focused on the design of the
workplace itself.130 This reconstructive approach put workplace structures
and norms at the center of questions about how to achieve gender equality at
work, asking “the same as” or “different from” what?131 It posited that the
law should focus on degendering the unexamined masculine norms at work,
so that, for example, taking a pregnancy leave or getting a temporary preg-
124 See supra Section II.A.
125 See supra Section II.B; Section III.B., infra (describing state laws).
126 See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 1–9, 64–113.
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See id. at 2–3.
130 See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 4, 40–63, 178–80, 213–26; Reconstructive
Feminism, supra note 17, at 82, 89–90, 98–102.
131 See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 55 (“Instead of simply allowing women to
work on the same terms traditionally available to men, we need to change the conditions under
which both men and women work. . . [It does] not go far enough [to] shift[ ] women into the
workforce without changing the rules of the game, . . .that employers were entitled to ideal
workers and. . . men. . .entitled to be them. Reconstructive feminism aims to go much further,
deconstructing domesticity by eliminating the ideal-worker norm”); Reconstructive Feminism,
supra note 17, at 82, 89–90, 98–102.
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nancy accommodation is not perceived as “special,” but rather a regular prac-
tice in a non-gendered workplace.132 Williams and her colleagues developed
a legal theory that recognized discrimination based on family responsibilities
or caregiver status, including pregnancy, as a sub-species of sex discrimina-
tion, driven by sex-role stereotypes about work and family.133 In 2007, the
EEOC issued formal guidance recognizing the theory.134
As Williams’ approach gained prominence in legal scholarship, the po-
litical power and leadership of women—and particularly mothers—also
grew,135 creating a critical mass pushing back on long-held stereotypes about
the incompatibility of work and motherhood. By the 2010s, criticism of the
persistence of pregnancy discrimination and the prevalence of pregnancy-
hostile workplaces reached a high-point, inspiring an interest in revisiting
federal law on pregnancy accommodation.136
III. FILLING IN THE PATCHWORK OF PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION
REQUIREMENTS
Recent legal developments around the law of pregnancy accommoda-
tion reflect both the political and legal history of the sameness/difference
debate and the emergence of a reconstructive approach. This Part documents
how both the U.S. Supreme Court, in its most recent holding on pregnancy
accommodation under Title VII, and advocates, in a newly unified legislative
agenda on the issue, reflect attempts to move beyond merely comparing
workers, toward unearthing and changing biased workplace structures.
A. Current Case Law: Young v. United Parcel Service
In 2015, the Supreme Court revisited pregnancy accommodation re-
quirements under federal law and provided a new interpretation of the PDA
in the case Young v. United Parcel Service.137 The case was brought by UPS
132 See Reconstructive Feminism, supra note 17, at 82, 89–90, 98–102.
133 See CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT ET AL., FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINA-
TION 4 (2014); see generally Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief
for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77
(2003) (describing legal theory); Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of
“FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and
Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311 (2008) (same).
134 See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, ENFORCE-
MENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING
RESPONSIBILITIES (2007), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html [https://
perma.cc/ERZ5-WDYY].
135 See, e.g., About MomsRising, MOMSRISING, https://www.momsrising.org/about
(describing founding in 2006 and growth to today); Kara Jesella, Mom’s Mad. And She’s Organ-
ized, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/22/fashion/22mothers.
html [https://perma.cc/45EU-HKGW]; Joan Blades and Kristin Rowe-Finkbeiner, The
Motherhood Manifesto, THE NATION (May 4, 2006), https://www.thenation.com/article/
archive/motherhood-manifesto/ [https://perma.cc/JEE4-KZPZ].
136 See infra Part III.
137 See generally Young v. United Parcel Serv., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\14-2\HLP210.txt unknown Seq: 20 20-OCT-20 13:29
312 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 14
driver Peggy Young, who alleged that UPS’ failure to accommodate her re-
quest for a temporary assignment to “light duty” to avoid heavy lifting while
pregnant when it provided light duty for other temporary disabilities consti-
tuted sex discrimination in violation of the PDA.138 At the heart of Young’s
case was the question of what was included in the PDA’s requirement that
pregnant workers be treated “the same as” others with temporary disabilities:
Did the statute require pregnancy accommodation if any other temporary
disability was accommodated or only if all other temporary disabilities were
accommodated?139
Prior to Young, case law and administrative guidance from the EEOC
on pregnancy discrimination140 had made several things clear. If an employer
provided light duty to workers for non-work-related temporary disabilities, it
had to do so for pregnancy disabilities.141 If an employer had a policy to only
cover work-related disabilities but, in practice, actually covered any non-
work-related disability—for example an employee’s heart attack or back in-
jury unrelated to the job—it had to do so for pregnancy disabilities.142 And at
least two federal courts allowed employees to argue that an employer’s policy
of providing light duty to accommodate only those with on-the-job injuries
could create an unlawful disparate impact on female workers.143 Yet the
question remained open: did an employer engage in intentional, unlawful
disparate treatment based on pregnancy when it limited its light duty to or
accommodated only work-related temporary disabilities?
Taking a formal equality approach that the Fourth Circuit had de-
scribed as “pregnancy-blind,” UPS argued that, because it limited who could
access light duties only to workers injured on the job, it was treating preg-
nancy “the same as” all other disabilities.144 A worker who broke their leg
while skiing outside of work would not be covered, so a woman disabled by
pregnancy unrelated to work could not be covered either. Taking a textual
approach that sought substantive equality, Young argued that the PDA did
138 See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
139 See id. at 1349.
140 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915.003, EEOC EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (2015),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm [https://perma.cc/44M8-
HSYZ] [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION].  Note,
the Guidance was initially issued July 14, 2014, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Young
v. UPS, but later updated and amended to be consistent with Young. See id. (noting that it
“supersedes the Enforcement Guidance. . .dated July 14, 2014,” but largely “remains the same
as the prior version,” with changes and deletions in certain sections “in response to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Young”).
141 See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1351–53; ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DIS-
CRIMINATION, supra note 142. Also see Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected
Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 67, 87–90
(2013).
142 See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1351–53; ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DIS-
CRIMINATION, supra note 142.
143 See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION, supra note 142
(citing Germain v. County of Suffolk, 2009 WL 1514513, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009) and
Woodard v. Rest Haven Christian Servs., 2009 WL 703270, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2009)).
144 See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
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not allow for a distinction between work and non-work-related injuries.
Under the text of the statute, if any employee received an accommodation
for a temporary disability, the employer had to provide the same for a preg-
nant worker; to fail to do so constituted sex discrimination.145
In a reflection of the confusion sown by the sameness/difference debate,
the Court sided with neither party, instead creating a new test under the
PDA that blurred lines between classic patterns of proof under Title VII. An
employee could make out a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination by
showing that, while she was denied an accommodation due to pregnancy,
“the employer did accommodate others ‘similar in their ability or inability to
work.’ ”146 The employer could argue this was justified by a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason—here, that it only accommodated temporary disabili-
ties that were work related.147 The employee could then show this reason was
pretextual by “providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies im-
pose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s
. . .reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when
considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of in-
tentional discrimination.”148 The Court explained that sufficient evidence
might be “that the employer accommodates a large percentage of non-
pregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of preg-
nant workers,” for example, allowing many workers lifting restrictions but
“categorically failing to accommodate pregnant employees” with the same.149
The goal of Plaintiff’s proof would be such that “a jury could find that [the
employer’s] reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees give rise
to an inference of intentional discrimination.”150
With this middle-ground approach, the Court attempted to walk the
line between unearthing hidden stereotypes about why an employer may re-
fuse to provide pregnancy accommodations without going so far as to require
expensive “special treatment” for only pregnant workers. Indeed, the decision
took a step toward a reconstructive approach by questioning the process and
structures in the workplace and the stereotypes that may lie beneath an em-
ployer’s decisions. But it did not fully achieve this end. As a result, the split
decision muddied the waters,151 and both parties in the lawsuit claimed
victory.152
145 See id. at 1349.





151 See Deborah Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From Unjustified
Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 590 (2017).
152 See, e.g, Robert Barnes & Brigid Schulte, Justices Revive Case Claiming UPS Discrimi-
nated Against Pregnant Worker, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/national/justices-revive-case-claiming-ups-discriminated-against-pregnant-worker/2015/
03/25/217223aa-d317-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html (quoting plaintiff Young as “ec-
static” (“This is nowhere close to being over, but it’s very positive not just for me, but for all
women”) and defendant UPS as “pleased” (“that the court did not find its policy at the time
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Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia explained that he would have sided
with UPS, holding that different treatment based on whether a temporary
disability was work-related was nondiscriminatory because, to hold other-
wise, “would elevate pregnant workers to most favored employees.”153
Scalia’s framing of pregnant workers who are accommodated so they can
continue working as receiving special treatment reflects the invisibility of the
masculine ideal-worker norm: the assumption that Title VII does not require
removing obstacles to equal opportunity if only women face them.  Yet the
Court majority also adopted and used Scalia’s frame, without questioning its
underlying premise, holding:
We doubt that Congress intended to grant pregnant workers an
unconditional most-favored-nation status. The language of the
statute does not require that unqualified reading. The [text], when
referring to nonpregnant persons with similar disabilities, uses the
open-ended term “other persons.” It does not say that the em-
ployer must treat pregnant employees the “same” as “any other
persons”. . . nor does it otherwise specify which other persons
Congress had in mind.154
The Court failed to recognize that, under a formally equal reading of
Title VII, workers who get pregnant always start from a least favored nation
status, such that any accommodation to remove this barrier is simply putting
them on a level playing field with men who will never be disabled by preg-
nancy at work.
B. Current Statutory Law: Toward Pregnant Worker Fairness
As the Young case was making its way through the courts, gender equal-
ity advocates turned to pursuing state and federal legislation. After several
advocacy organizations called attention to the failure of many employers to
provide even minor accommodations to pregnant women, particularly those
in lower-paid positions,155 the EEOC issued new Enforcement Guidance on
was inherently discriminatory. . .[and] ‘confident that [lower] courts will find that UPS did not
discriminate against Ms. Young under this newly announced standard’”))) [https://perma.cc/
FUR8-MG2F].
153 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1362 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349-50.
155 See generally STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, U.C. HASTINGS
COLLEGE OF LAW, POOR, PREGNANT, AND FIRED: CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
LOW-WAGE WORKERS (2011), https://worklifelaw.org/publications/PoorPregnan-
tAndFired.pdf [https://perma.cc/V43G-BXWH]; NOREEN FARRELL ET. AL., EQUAL
RIGHTS ADVOCATES, EXPECTING A BABY, NOT A LAY-OFF: WHY FEDERAL LAW
SHOULD REQUIRE THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF PREGNANT WORKERS (2012),
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/ERA_ExpectingABabyNotALay-off_2012.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QS8V-48CM]; NATL. WOMEN’S LAW CTR & A BETTER BALANCE, IT
SHOULDN’T BE A HEAVY LIFT: FAIR TREATMENT FOR PREGNANT WORKERS (2013),
https://www.abetterbalance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ItShouldntBeAHeavyLift.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DCK-JDMM].
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pregnancy discrimination.156 The Guidance explained the full reach of preg-
nancy accommodations under the PDA and the ADA and recommended, as
a “best practice,” that employers“[h]ave a process in place for expeditiously
considering reasonable accommodation requests made by employees with
pregnancy-related disabilities, and for granting accommodations where
appropriate.”157
State and federal legislators also began to act, proposing a flurry of new
legislation to address gaps in federal law.158 As of March 2020, over half of
states (twenty-eight) and a handful of localities, including New York City,
have now enacted laws that require at least some level of affirmative preg-
nancy accommodation, beyond federal law’s equal treatment approach.159
The laws vary as to the type and size of employer they cover—for example,
three apply to public sector employers only, sixteen apply to employers with
six or fewer employees, and the remaining nine to employers ranging in size
from at least twelve to twenty-five employees.160 Likewise, their coverage
varies, from requiring transfer to a “less strenuous or hazardous position” to
requiring modified work schedules to requiring all reasonable accommoda-
tions, including allowing food and drink on the job or the ability to sit or use
the bathroom more frequently.161 Notably, twenty-three of the twenty-eight
laws were enacted since 2013162—a signal of how the politics behind the
popularity of such measures has changed dramatically in the most recent
decade.
Popular opinion has also started to swing toward passing a pregnancy
accommodation law at the federal level. After being introduced in each legis-
lative session since 2012, the most recent version of the federal Pregnant
Worker’s Fairness Act was introduced in the House of Representatives in
May 2019 with bipartisan support,163 and has even been endorsed by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.164 In line with the California model, the bill
would require all employers covered by Title VII to “make reasonable ac-
commodations to the known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions of a job applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
156 See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION, supra note 142.
157 See id. at Part IV.
158 See A Better Balance, supra note 12, at 1.
159 See id. at 1.
160 See generally id.
161 See generally id.
162 Id. at 1.
163 Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 2694, 116th Cong. § 2(1) (2019) (listed with
214 Democratic and 15 Republican co-sponsors as of March 4, 2020);
164 See A Better Balance, Fact Sheet: The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://www.abetterbalance.org/resources/fairness-for-pregnant-workers-bill-factsheet [https:/
/perma.cc/Y9FK-W9VH] (citing U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Applauds Committee Approval of Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (Jan. 14, 2020), https://
www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-of-commerce-applauds-committee-approval-
of-pregnant-workers-fairness-act [https://perma.cc/44V7-H5RM]).
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undue hardship on the operation of the business.”165 As such, it would create
a uniform, federal requirement that makes clear that the workplace must
adapt to the worker, who may be a pregnant woman.
The bill has yet to pass and faces the same major challenges as any piece
of federal legislation proposed in Congress. But that it has bipartisan and
popular support shows a marked shift in the politics of the issue of preg-
nancy accommodation at work. Women now not only compose nearly half
of the U.S. labor market, but they play a nearly equal role in family bread-
winning, they are a powerful voting bloc in popular elections, and they have
greater representation in the legislature and on the Supreme Court.166 While
sex role stereotypes about men and women’s relative duties toward childrear-
ing may remain, the idea that the workplace can simply ignore the issue of
pregnancy has, at long last, begun to change.
CONCLUSION
For over a century, women have participated in the industrialized
workforce; for decades, they have composed a major segment of the U.S.
labor market. Yet long outdated notions of sex-role stereotypes maintain a
powerful grip on U.S. workplace law and policy. Stemming from separate
spheres concepts that men belong in the market sphere and women in the
domestic, U.S. workplaces were—and largely remain—designed around a
male worker norm, free from family, domestic, and childbearing
responsibilities.
Since Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 first prohibited sex
discrimination at work, legislators, courts, and even gender equality advo-
cates themselves have struggled to define what it means to treat workers
“equally” when only half of them may become pregnant. At the federal level,
advocates took a politically expedient equal treatment approach, expanding
options for pregnant workers by expanding gender-neutral leave and accom-
modations for both men and women. Yet such efforts still left women, who
bear a much greater need for pregnancy-related benefits, at a disadvantage.
At the state level, some advocates pursued a substantive equality approach,
seeking additional benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities for women only,
to counteract their disadvantage. Ultimately both “sameness” and “differ-
ence” approaches to antidiscrimination law brought gains, but both main-
tained a focus on comparing female to male workers, leaving underlying
assumptions of workplace design unchallenged.
In the most recent decade, however, both feminist theory and the polit-
ics around pregnancy discrimination have evolved. Reconstructive feminism
has exposed the masculine “ideal-worker norm,” that, left unaddressed, will
165 Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 2694, 116th Cong. § 2(1) (2019).
166 See supra notes 6-9, 137, and accompanying text.
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always disadvantage women at work.167 Women have gained political power
and representation in the courts and legislatures, able to act to remedy the
pregnancy discrimination they have seen and experienced. With over half of
states now requiring affirmative accommodations for pregnant workers and
bipartisan support for a federal bill,168 the tide is beginning to turn. Someday,
hopefully soon, asking for minor accommodations to be able to continue
working through a pregnancy will be routine—and entirely apolitical.
167 See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 17, at 4, 40–63, 178–80, 213–26; Reconstructive
Feminism, supra note 17, at 82, 89–90, 98–102.
168 See supra Section III.B.
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